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The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property*
George M. Armstrong, Jr.**
A federal court jury today awarded blues singer Tom Waits
$2.475 million Tuesday in his suit against Frito-Lay Inc. and
its ad agency, finding that they illegally impersonated his voice
for a radio jingle to advertise a new corn chip.
UPI May 8, 1990
Litigation which concerns a celebrity always attracts the attention
of the public. Recent decisions in which Bette Midler and Tom Waits
vanquished defendants who imitated their craft for advertising purposes
are examples.' The public's attention in such cases usually lights upon
the amount of money at issue, the aggressive tactics of ad agencies, or
the putative threat to advertisers' creative freedom. Newspaper and even
academic commentary are typically most interested in the effect of these
decisions on the advertising and entertainment industries. Rarely does
the public read about the broader implications of these decisions, about
the meaning of these cases in late twentieth century America.
Few readers of the popular press would learn that these cases are
the culmination of one hundred years of legal evolution. Only two
decades ago a celebrity had no cause of action against an advertiser
who imitated her voice.2 Until the 1970's any commercial value associated
with celebrity was personal to the star and entered the public domain
at death. As recently as the early 1950's celebrities could not assign the
right to use their name and likeness.3 At the beginning of this century
the law denied relief even to the living person whose name or likeness
was the object of illicit appropriation .4
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW.
* Editor's Note: Professor Armstrong was in the process of completing this article
prior to his death. Because he was unable to concur in any textual changes, it is presented
here with only technical editing to preserve the author's intent.
** Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); The case of Waits v.
Frito-Lay, Inc. is unreported.
2. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906, 91 S. Ct. 1376 (1971).
3. Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 816, 74 S. Ct. 26 (1953) is usually considered the progenitor of the right to
publicity. It is the first case to hold that the assignee of a right of persona might enjoin
a trespasser.
4. Dockrell v. Dougall, 78 L.T.R. 840 (Q.B. 1898); Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
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Clearly the law affords more protection to the commercial value of
celebrity status now than at any previous time.' Celebrity persona has
become a heritable, alienable "thing" from which the owner may ar-
bitrarily exclude others. In other words, it has become property. The
Waits and Midler decisions merely flesh out the content of the right of
persona, adding the star's intangible "style" to the more specific at-
tributes of name and likeness.
The right of persona has acquired the form of property incrementally
over the course of this century. This article explores how and why this
process occurred. By showing how celebrity persona has become prop-
erty, I will lay out the gradual accretion of characteristics such as the
right to exclude and alienate usually associated with property. My pur-
pose is to remind my colleagues who teach in this area that property
is always the fruit of evolution; but the right to exclude others from
land, chattels and even inventions crystallized so long ago that we lose
sight of the process and see only the product.
My explanation of why the law now recognizes property in persona
is necessarily more conjectural. It involves the history or marketing and
mass media, the evolution of technology and changing concepts of value.
I suggest these and allied historical processes, developments which I
shall call collectively "commodification," are always responsible for the
creation of property. I anticipate the reply that analysis of this type is
merely history and of no practical interest to the lawyer. In response
I maintain that nothing is of more practical value to a student whose
career may span half a century than an understanding of why the law
changes.
What is Property?
If we leave aside Proudhon's incomparable dictum that "property
is robbery," 5 we see that authoritative definitions have significant dif-
ferences which we may attribute to the customs and technology of the
time. The Siete Partidas of Alfonso the Wise, framed in eleventh century
Castile, define ownership as "the power which a man has over his own
property to do with it, and in it whatever he desires to do, without
violation of the law of God or those of the country." ' 6 Subsequent
passages expand this definition to include the right to collect and enjoy
fruits and the right to alienate. Alfonso's emphasis on the right of
unfettered use is common to many other statements of the right of
5. P. Proudhoun, What is Property 38 (1902).
6. Las Siete Partidas, Part. III, Tit. XXVIII, Law I, (Scott translation 1931).
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ownership. 7 It reflects the technology of an earlier age in which owners
in fact had few options of use: planting, pasturage and building. Lim-
itations on the use of property became commonplace only in this century
as technology allowed owners to undertake increasingly obnoxious ac-
tivities on their land.
Absent from Alfonso's definition and from most others prior to
the twentieth century is any mention of the right to exclude, the char-
acteristic which most modern writers claim is the hallmark of property.
Morris Cohen, a recent theorist of the regulated economy, wrote that
"the essence of private property is always the right to exclude others."'
C.B. Macpherson also recognizes that the right to exclude is central to
the modem concept of property. 9 Because Macpherson's political pro-
gram urges the redefinition of property to encompass the right not to
be excluded from forms of value which he describes as common goods,
his observations on the right to exclude are particularly interesting.
"From Plato to Bodin, theorists could talk about common property as
well as private."' 0 Modern writers, however, have lost sight of this
tradition.
If legal theorists have substituted the right to exclude for the un-
fettered right of use as the defining characteristic of property, this
development may be the consequence of evolution in the legal treatment
of ownership itself. The growth of the regulatory state and its limitations
of the right to use property are obvious to everyone as the New Deal
approaches its fiftieth anniversary. What is less apparent, because it is
historically removed, is the evolution of the right to exclude. The Siete
Partidas did not mention this right because it hardly existed in the
Middle Ages. A brief examination of Castillian society demonstrates
that privately owned land was secondary in importance to the common
property of towns and that the right to exclude was severely restricted
even on individual land.
7. Code Napoleon art. 544: "Property is the right of enjoying and disposing of
things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by
the laws or statutes." (Hunter ed. 1824) Proudhoun wrote that property "expresses the
right of absolute control over a thing by a free and intelligent being." P. Proudhoun,
supra note 5, at 80.
8. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, in C. Macpherson, Property 159 (1978). Com-
pare the definition of ownership in the Napoleonic Code in the preceding note with the
German Civil Code adopted a century later. Art. 903: The owner of a thing may, to the
extent that it is not contrary to the law or the rights of third persons, deal with the
thing as he pleases and exclude others from any interference. BGB art. 903 (Rothman
1975) French commentators have also begun to emphasize the right to exclude at the
expense of the right of use. "[Ownership] is the right by virtue of which a thing is subject
perpetually and exclusively to the acts and will of a person." 3 Planiol et Ripert, Traite
pratique de droit civil francais 220 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
9. Id. at 202.
10. Id.
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Municipal land of the towns included a variety of forms of common
use. Ejidos were open for recreation and grazing, montes provided
firewood, nuts, fruit and wild vegetables, and prados, the highest grade
of land, offered rich pasture." Towns also acquired prescriptive rights
to baldias, land which the crown captured in the Christian reconquest
of the Iberian peninsula.12 Owing to occasional purchases and frequent
encroachment, municipal land ownership grew in importance until the
nineteenth century.
Some municipal property was set apart for individual cultivation.
Styled entradiza because laborers acquired rights to this land by entering
it, this form of tenure was quite fragile. 3 It also illustrates the medieval
principle that people consolidate and maintain property rights by pro-
ductive use. The duration of entradiza tenure was the life of the laborer
and his spouse, but the passing of a year and a day without cultivation
extinguished these rights. At the death of the last surviving spouse,
tenure passed to the first person who entered the land.14 Not surprisingly
children often concealed the death of their parents, even denying them
last rights, until they could take possession.
Privately owned land also was open to the community in many
instances. Strangers might legally gather plants and nuts anywhere so
long as they were the fruit of nature exclusively and not of husbandry."
Moreover, the owners' right to exclude from lands of private cultivation
lasted only during the growing season.' 6 From about September to May
landless peasants enjoyed grazing rights on privately owned land through-
out Castile. Animal deposits of manure were compensation for any
inconvenience to the landowner.
Finally, the guild of itinerant drovers, the Mesta, possessed virtually
unimpeded rights of passage for migratory sheep flocks. 7 Their biannual
transit across the length of the peninsula was severely annoying to the
cultivators whose crops the sheep destroyed. Because of the central
importance of wool production to the economic program of monarchs
of the old regime, the rights of migratory herders finally grew to the
point where the drovers might traverse without charge any land on which
11. D. Vassberg, Land and Society in Golden Age Castille, 26-40 (1986). See also
Jerome Blum, The European Village as Community: Origins and Functions, 45 Agriculture
History 157-158 (1971); 1 The Cambridge Economic History of Europe (Agrarian Life in
the Middle Ages) (1966); C. Smith, Western Mediterranean Europe: A Historical Geography
of Italy, Spain and Southern France since the Neolithic, 35-37, 89-91, 239-256 (1979).
12. D. Vassberg, supra note 11, at 6-10.
13. Id. at 41-42.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 55-56.
16. Id. at 13-18.
17. Id. at 79-83.
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the herds had ever trespassed. Disputes between landowners and the
Mesta were resolved by an official of the guild, causing many aggrieved
cultivators to complain of the monarchs' partiality toward sheep owners.
Similar arrangements existed in England where common lands were
open for public grazing. At least from the time of Henry VII owners
in fee strove to enclose these commons for pasture or cultivation. The
Tudor kings steadfastly opposed enclosure because of the unemployment
and dislocation it caused. Their first efforts were indirect. Statutes of
1488 and 1489 required tenants to maintain all buildings necessary to
keep the land in cultivation or the lord of the fee might enter and take
one-half the profits until the buildings were repaired.' 8 Enormous social
pressure supported enclosure, however, for the people responsible for
constructing the fences were usually men of society's governing class.
Holdsworth observes that in the sixteenth century government was able
to act against enclosure of pasture only when distraught laborers threat-
ened the civil peace. 19
A number of statutes of the sixteenth century required owners of
the fee to provide some compensation to laborers who lost their rights
in the common, but landowners ignored the laws. In 1624 the government
repealed them all. 20 The result, according to Holdsworth, was an increase
in the price of land. "The common field systems left little scope for
the energies of an interprising man. It was otherwise under the new
system under which compact farms were managed by one person." '2'
In the late seventeenth century landowners began to obtain private
acts of Parliament authorizing the enclosure of commons upon little or
no compensation for the people dispossessed. The reign of Queen Anne
saw only two such statutes, but Parliament enacted sixteen under George
I, 226 under George II and 3,360 during the years of George 111.22
Holdsworth observed that "new economic theorists were beginning to
stress the absolute rights of the owners of property, and the economic
advantage of allowing them the fullest power to develop it. ' ' 23 Blackstone
is a transitional figure in this process. He explains that mankind once
had only a transient attachment to land so that "no part of it was the
permanent property of any man in particular; ' 24 (he provides no dates)
but "when mankind increased in number, craft and ambition, it became
necessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion; and
to appropriate to individuals not the immediate use only, but the very
18. 4 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 365 (1977).
19. Id. at 367.
20. Id. at 366.
21. Id. at 371.
22. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 625 (1977).
23. Id. at 456-57.
24. 2 W. Blackstone, Commentary on the Laws of England, 3 (Reprint 1966).
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substance of the thing to be used. ' 25 Elsewhere Blackstone writes of
this "sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises
over the external things of this world, in total exclusion of any other
individual in the universe." 26
Perhaps Blackstone is so adamant because his doctrine is less dis-
passionate analysis and more advocacy for the enclosure process. En-
closure continued for another century. An act of 1845 allowed fencing
of all remaining common land and termination of all public grazing
rights; 27 but even in the late twentieth century the English public retains
significant rights in privately owned land. Public footpaths of 108,000
miles crisscross private farms. 2 Self-appointed guardians of these paths
are vigilant to prevent private interference with these rights. The Wall
Street Journal observes that footpaths are the last "of many common
privileges." Evidently Blackstone adhered to an ideology of exclusive
rights which was somewhat ahead of its time.
Commodification of Value
In this section I examine the dialectical relationship of the ideology
of exclusivity for land and other "things" and the growth of market
exchange.
The legal doctrine of ownership as exclusive rights is both a con-
sequence of and a stimulus to market exchange. The dialectical character
of this relationship consists of the mutual reinforcement for one another
which the ideology and the social process of exchange provide. Marx
first recognized this process by which values acquire the legal charac-
teristics necessary for fluid movement in the market. He described this
process in Capital as the creation of commodities.
It is only by being exchanged that the products of labour acquire,
as values, one uniform social status, distinct from their varied
forms of existence as objects of utility.29
Lukhcs ° and Pashukanis3' perceived the centrality of comodification
in Marx's philosophy. We are indebted to Pashukanis in particular for
applying this theory to the study of law.
Marx traces the origins of the commodity to the replacement of
self-sufficient production and barter with sales as a means of supplying
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id. at 2.
27. 13 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 353 (1977).
28. Wall Street Journal, May 7, 1990, at 1, col. 4.
29. K. Marx, Capital, reprinted in The Marx-Engels Reader, 321 (R. Tucker ed.
1978).
30. G. Lukics, History and Class Consciousness (1971).
31. E. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism (1989).
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life's necessities. Although people have always been aware of the use-
value of these items, the exchange of food, clothing, tools and other
items through the intermediary money gave these items a new, apparently
objective characteristic: exchange value.
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in
it the social character of men's labour appears to them as an
objective character stamped upon the product of that labour;
because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their
own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing
not between themselves but between the products of their la-
bour.3 2
Historical research reveals that this process has expanded over the
centuries. The replacement of the natural economy by market exchange
occurred nowhere overnight and proceeded at varying rates in different
societies. Supply of necessities through the market did not crowd out
subsistence production in most western societies until the nineteenth
century. Thomas Jefferson observed the predominance of the natural
economy as late as the time of the Revolution writing, "[w]e never had
any interior trade of any importance . . . we have manufactured within
our families the most necessary articles of clothing." 33
Land was a static resource until about the same time. Many factors
including mortmain, entail, strict settlement, family tradition, the absence
of real estate tax, and the abundance of land on the frontier conspired
to keep it out of commerce. So long as land remained a static resource,
the elaborate net of community rights described earlier was no great
hindrance to its use. When land became an object of commerce, however,
these community rights diminished its exchange value because they en-
gendered substantial uncertainty as to exactly what the purchaser was
acquiring. As Pashukanis observed, "Feudal property's chief failing in
the eyes of the bourgeois world lies not in its origin (plunder, violence),
but in its inertia, the fact that it cannot form the object of a mutual
guarantee by changing hands through alienation and acquisition. ' 3 4 Land
could not become an object of commerce until the central legislatures
of western Europe usurped from local customary law the authority to
define who had access to property. The defect of custom from the
standpoint of the bourgeoisie was not only the extent of community
use, the fractured nature of ownership, but also the enormous variation
in these rights from place to place.35
32. K. Marx, supra note 29, at 320.
33. 16 T. Jefferson, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 290 (Q. Boyd ed. 1961).
34. E. Pashukanis, supra note 31, at 123.
35. Id. at 119.
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The law relating to land acquired a new character-the right to
exclude-as a consequence of purchasers' desire to establish with cer-
tainty, under uniform, strict rules enforced by courts, the exact content
of their purchase.
If then, development [of property] began from appropriation
... this relation was transformed into a legal one, as a result
of needs created by circulation of goods, primarily that is, by
buying and selling .... The establishment of permanent markets
created the necessity for settling the question of right of disposal
over commodities, and hence for property law.3 6
The commodification of value is a slow historical process. Earlier
we saw that land in England acquired the characteristics which modern
law associates with property over the course of centuries. For the purpose
of our analysis, this process has two important attributes. First, the
gradual replacement of the natural economy by market exchange en-
courages the legal system to endow ever more different forms of value
with the characteristics of property. In a previous work I showed how
inventions became property in our society during the nineteenth century. 37
Second, the expansion of commodification to include ever more forms
of value fosters an ideology supportive of this process so that stable
ownership, the right to exclude and to alienate, are no longer the
characteristics of some forms of value, they are a social expectation for
all forms of value." Professor Powell offers support for this interpre-
tation when he remarks, "a new opportunity for property rights arises
whenever technological advances, or social changes, reveal a new
scarcity."39
36. Id. at 122. "[Pjroperty ceases to be unstable, precarious, purely factual property
which may at any moment be contested and have to be defended, weapon in hand. It
is transformed into an absolute, fixed right which follows the object wherever chance
may take it." Id. at 115. C.B. Macpherson writes, "As rights in land became more
absolute, and parcels of land became freely marketable commodities, it became natural
to think of the land itself as the property .... [The change was] that previously unsaleable
rights in things were now saleable; or, to put it differently, that limited and not always
saleable rights in things were being replaced by virtually unlimited and saleable rights to
things." Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in C. McPherson, Property 7 (1978).
37. See Armstrong, From the Fetishism of Commodities to the Market: The Rise
and Decline of Property, 82 Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. 79 (1987).
38. "Just as the capitalist system continuously produces and reproduces itself eco-
nomically on higher and higher levels, the structure of reification progressively sinks more
deeply, more fatefully and more definitively into the conciousness of man." G. Luklcs,
supra note 30, at 93.
39. 1 R. Powell & P. Rohan, Powell on Real Property at 26. See also Radin, Justice
and the Market Domain, in Nomos XXXI, Markets and Justice 167 (1989). ("Under
universal commodification, all things desired or valuable ... are goods or commodities.").
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Csaba Varga, a student of Lukdcs', explains that reification, the
transformation of value into things, integrates "an ever increasing por-
tion of the natural-social environment of the law into the system of
legal control." 4 As commodity production and exchange become in-
creasingly important, the legal prerequisites for exchange "become the
natural premises . .. of all social intercourse." '4 1 Pashukanis wrote that
market exchange has even influenced ethical philosophy, that the liberal
concept of the individual as autonomous, egoistical and an end in himself
is a consequence of the notion that people are bearers of subjective
rights and that the notion of subjective rights arose in the market.4 2
"Only the continual reshuffling of values in the market creates the idea
of a fixed bearer of such rights." 43
The notion that we who live in capitalist societies are marinated in
the market to the extent that our religion, friendship, concept of self
and understanding of morality are deeply influenced by the means through
which we acquire necessities is obviously provocative. 4 Several contem-
porary social theorists have used this notion as a point of departure
for analyzing what we Americans value in an "intangible sense." 45
Following the publication of his seminal work in 1924, Pashukanis
formed with several proteges an informal "commodity exchange school
of law," the mission of which was confirmation of his theories by
historical analysis." Stalin's liquidation of Pashukanis in 1937 along
with many other members of the legal elite cut short these efforts.
40. C. Varga, The Place of Law in Lukics' World Concept 161 (1985). Professor
Radin notes that universal commodification "assimilates personal attributes, relations, and
desired states of affairs into the realm of objects. Universal commodification implies that
all things can and should be separable from persons and exchanged through the free
market, whenever some people are willing to sell and others are willing to buy." Radin,
supra note 39.
41. E. Pashukanis, supra note 31, at 83.
42. Id. at 151. ("Man as a moral subject, that is a personality of equal worth, is
indeed no more than a necessary condition for exchange according to the law of value.")
("At the beginning of the seventeenth century [the term] individual was first applied to
human beings to denote a single person as opposed to society or the family, and not
until Tocqueville's Democracy in America do we get the word individualism.") See also
J. Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order 15 (1984).
43. E. Pashukanis, supra note 31, at 118.
44. G. Luk/gacs, supra note 30, at 93; E. Pashukanis, supra note 31, at 83; K.
Marx, supra note 29, at 321.
45. Radin, supra note 39 at 167-68. See also reponses by Mack, Dominos and the
Fear of Commodification; Lane, Market Choice and Human Choice; Narveson, The Justice
of the Market: Comments on Grey and Radin, all in Nomos XXXI, Markets and Justice
(1989).
46. E. Pashukanis, supra note 31, at 14-15; R. Sharlet, Pashukanis and the Commodity
Exchange Theory of Law, 1924-1930 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation); Z. Zile, Ideas and
Forces in Soviet Legal History, 235-36 (1970).
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In this article I propose to take up this torch and apply Pashukanis'
theory to the creation of a modern form of property, the right of
publicity. As an object of analysis the right of publicity is superior to
land in several respects. The commodification of land was a fitful
process, persisting several hundred years. In contrast, the right of pub-
licity has developed entirely during this century. Second, the economic
environment of the commodification of land encompasses the whole
history of capitalism. The motivations of the significant actors in this
process and even the consequences of their actions will remain speculative
until they are carefully analyzed in a forum substantially larger than a
traditional law review article. The right of publicity, on the other hand,
is entirely the creature of modern judges who often express their un-
derstanding of the relation of law to the market quite articulately.
Consequently these judicial opinions constitute a sort of debate on the
propriety of commodifying the persona. Finally, the economic and social
context of the development which we are examining: the use of pro-
fessional models, technical advances in photography, lithography and
sound reproduction, are most accessible to us although historians of
advertising must still discover and analyze the social attitudes which
accompanied these advances. For example, our understanding of the
commodification of persona would be enhanced if we knew whether
early twentieth century American society considered professional models
to be prostitutes or respectable business people.
Early Thoughts on the Right of Persona
Although French scientists invented photography in the first third
of the nineteenth century, the legal community did not turn its attention
to the issue of caption and reproduction of a photographic image until
much later. In 1869 the author of a brief note in the American Law
Register reported that he had heard a case in Europe in which a woman
of great beauty recovered damages for the reproduction of her image
without consent. Lacking any official report of the case, the author was
forced to speculate on its holding. "Special damage may have formed
the basis of it; but it cannot be doubted, that had there been none,
her right to control the market of her own beauty could not have been
denied her by any court . . . . -47 The author wonders "whether there
was not a violation of a sort of natural copyright, possessed by every
person of his or her own features .... "48
Had the author of the note obtained a report of the case, he might
have discovered rather the true ground of the holding was a breach of
47. The Legal Relations of Photographs, 8 Amer. L. Reg. N.S. 1,8 (1869).
48. Id.
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contract or violation of confidence, that is the reproduction and sale
of a photograph which the defendant had taken at the plaintiff's request.
One of the first reported English cases involved the reproduction in
breach of confidence of a photograph taken with the plaintiff's consent.4 9
In the course of oral argument Lord North asked plaintiff's counsel
whether the person who made the photograph might sell it "if the
negative likeness were taken on the sly." Counsel replied, "In that case
there would be no contract or consideration to support a contract."
And, consequently, there would be no legal wrong.
That English case and a handful of similar proceedings were the
foundation of The Right of Privacy, the seminal article of Warren and
Brandeis.5 0 Although the holding in each of these cases ostensibly lay
on breach of contract or trust, the authors maintained that invasion of
privacy was the true basis of recovery.51 They describe privacy as a
"right of property. 5 2
Warren and Brandeis were probably wrong about the actual ground
of these English decisions. 3 Attorneys for the plaintiffs never claimed
to rest their petitions on a right of privacy or property rights in one's
features, but upon traditional grounds such as improper publication of
photographs which the defendant held in trust.5 4 Moreover, even if the
true ground of these decisions were invasion of privacy, Warren and
Brandeis were incorrect to describe this novel concept as a right of
property. Recovery, they emphasize, is based on mental suffering, not
on mere trespass.5 Thus, if the right which they espouse existed, it was
vindicated by tort, not property law.
The consensus of academic opinion opposed the recognition of a
right of privacy regardless of whether tort or property was its point of
departure. A student note in the Columbia Law Review rejected the
notion of a cause of action in tort observing, "there are many impertinent
and disagreeable things which one may suffer from another that do not
amount to legal injuries such as courts may redress."15 6 Moreover, the
student emphatically denied the application of property law to this type
49. Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345 (1888).
50. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
51. Id. at 205.
52. Id. at 209.
53. Hadley, The Right of Privacy, 3 Northwestern L. Rev. 1 (1895).
54. In the most important of these cases, counsel for the Queen maintained, "The
interference of this court is not asked for on grounds of decorum or good taste, but
upon tle general principle that this court will protect every person in the free and innocent
use of his own property and will prevent anyone from interfering with that use to the
injury of the owner." See Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeG. & Sm. 652 (1849) cited in
Hadley, supra note 53.
55. Z. Zile, supra note 46, at 212-13.
56. Note, The Right of Privacy, 2 Col. L. Rev. 437, 439 (1902).
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of injury. His analysis is quoted at length because it expresses so
completely the sentiment of the times that the human likeness may not
be a commodity.
We may discard entirely the suggestion that a lady has anything
in the nature of a property right in her form or features that
is invaded by the circulation of her picture . . . A woman's
beauty, next to her virtues, is her earthly crown, but it would
be degradation to hedge it about by rules and principles appli-
cable to land and chattels.7
Commentators on the other side of the Atlantic expressed the same
view."8
A survey of case law from the turn of the century demonstrates
that plaintiffs who objected to the use of their name or likeness for
advertising purposes usually lay their claim on embarrassment, humili-
ation, emotional distress or discomfort. Some courts were unwilling to
grant relief even in light of such injury; but the presence of evidence
of actual harm in the pleadings and testimony indicate that plaintiffs
were not claiming a right to exclude others arbitrarily from the use of
their persona. Although there were exceptions, relief usually sounded in
tort.
Several early cases denied relief altogether. In one instance parents
sought damages for the sale of photographs of their child.5 9 The court
refused recovery, stating "the law does not take cognizance of, and will
not afford compensation for, sentimental injury, independent of redress
for a wrong involving physical injury to person or property." An English
court denied relief on similar grounds upon facts which seem much
more favorable to recovery. The plaintiff, a physician, alleged that
defendant had used his name and a fictitious professional endorsement
to advertise an elixirA° The doctor's claim for damages relied upon
humiliation and embarrassment as well as the notion that the defendant's
advertisement created the false impression that the plaintiff had done
something which respectable professionals scrupulously avoid: sell his
name. The court denied an injunction inasmuch as the advertisement
did not injure the doctor's reputation or property.
57. Id.
58. "We believe that most generally received opinion in the possession to be that
the unwilling patient of a 'snapshotter' sustains no injury, nor are his rights violated even
by an exhibition or sale of the photograph so taken." The Ubiquitous Photographer,
The Solicitors' Journal and Weekly Reporter, 504, June 2, 1917.
59. Murray v. Gast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 8 Misc. Rep. 36, 28 N.Y.S. 271
(1894).
60. Dockrell v. Dougall, 78 L.T.R. 840 (Q.B. 1898) ("Dr. Dockrell says: Nothing
has done his gout so much good.").
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At about the same time the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected
the doctrine of privacy in a proceeding which objected to the defendant's
use of his name and photograph of a deceased politician to advertise
cigars. 6' The court's reasoning indicates that the judge could not dis-
tinguish between the use of another's name for trade or advertising and
the use of his name to christen an infant. "A disreputable person or
criminal may select the name of the most exemplary for his child, or
for his horse or dog or monkey. We have never heard this questioned.
No reason occurs to us for limiting the right to apply a name, though
borne by another person, to animate objects.''62
The hypothesis of this article is that commodification of name and
likeness had not advanced sufficiently at the turn of the century for
judges to conceive of persona as a "thing." The defendant had not
taken any tangible property of the plaintiff or deprived him of anything
of value. Having no experience with modern advertising, the judges did
not consider the use of another's name to be a commercial transaction,
nor did they imagine that any of the plaintiffs had been deprived of
the opportunity to market their personae. Such opportunities were prac-
tically nonexistent in those days.63
The most important of this series of cases arose in New York in
1902.6 The defendant made and sold lithographs of the plaintiff's like-
ness as an advertisement for flour. The plaintiff's allegations clearly
sound in tort, not property: her family and friends recognized her
features. She was humiliated, suffered in body and mind and was
confined to bed. There is no allegation that the plaintiff had been
deprived of a commercial opportunity. (Indeed the young lady would
probably have been appalled by such a suggestion.) Nor is there any
hint that the defendant was unjustly enriched or had taken something
free of charge for which advertisers usually pay. The court denied
recovery, noting that "equity has no concern with the feelings of an
individual.' '65 The court distinguished each of the cases which Brandeis
and Warren had cited in support of a right of privacy, finding that all
concerned breach of trust or violation of a plaintiff's property right in
particular photographs. The following year the New York legislature
61. Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899). "[We are of
the opinion that Col. John Atkinson would himself be remediless, were he alive ... 
62. Id.
63. One nineteenth century case opined that "a private individual has a right to be
protected in the representation of his portrait in any form; [and] that this is a property
as well as a personal right .... The court denied recovery, holding that the plaintiff,
a well-known man, had in effect dedicated his features to the public. Corliss v. E.W.
Walker Co., 64 F. 280, 281-82 (Mass. 1894).
64. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
65. Id. at 444.
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enacted a law to prevent the unauthorized use of the name or picture
of any person for the purpose of trade."
In the ensuing years courts began to grant recovery for this type
of conduct, but generally rested their holdings on tortious harm to the
plaintiff. As one court said, "if the right of privacy exists and has been
recognized by law, it must be a personal tort right." 6 7 The Supreme
Court of Georgia located a tortious wrong simply in interference with
the plaintiff's seclusion; 6 but most cases involved risk of more serious
injury. When a commercial enterprise used Thomas Edison's name,
likeness, and a forged certificate of authenticity to promote its product,
a New Jersey court found a tortious wrong in a false statement which
exposed the great inventor to the risk of pecuniary liability. 69 Similarly,
the Supreme Court of Kansas sympathized with a young woman who
had become the object of gossip after the defendant secretly obtained
and used her photograph to advertise its dry goods store.7 0 The young
lady presented the testimony of her neighbors to show the adverse affect
of the publicity on her reputation.
Although Thomas Edison and the Kansas ingenue obtained their
judgments on the basis of financial or emotional injury, both cases
contain a hint of recognition that one's persona may have commercial
value. One source of embarrassment for the young lady was the wide-
spread belief among her acquaintances "that she had for hire permitted
her picture to be taken and used as a public advertisement.171 The
judges recognized the existence of a market for this commodity, but
understood that it was not a market which ladies would enter. The New
Jersey court also wondered whether Edison's name and likeness were
not his property. Admitting that he could find no support in the cases
for such a holding, the judge ruminated, "it is difficult to understand
why the peculiar cast of one's features is not also one's property, and
why its pecuniary value, if it has one, does not belong to its owner
90'72
In 1909 the Kentucky Court of Appeals also recognized the begin-
nings of a market in individuals' names and affirmed that polite society
did not participate in this commerce.73 When Doan's Kidney pills pub-
66. § 50(1) N.Y. Civil Rights Laws, Ch. 132, p. 308 (1903).
67. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 102 (R.I. 1909). The court found no basis
for recovery in tort either.
68. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). "[W]e venture
to predict that the day will come that the American bar will marvel that a contrary view
was ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability .... " Id. at 81.
69. Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392 (N.J. Chan. 1907).
70. Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532 (Kans. 1918).
71. Id.
72. Supra note 69, at 394.
73. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. App. 1909).
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lished the plaintiff's likeness with an allegedly false endorsement, the
victims sued for libel. As part of his evidence the plaintiff showed the
existence of a scale of prices for endorsements of this sort, not because
he sought quasi-contractual compensation, but because "this proof would
tend to show that persons who knew of the custom of paying for such
cards might conclude that the plaintiff had sold his signature." 74 The
court determined that he might recover on any of three grounds: invasion
of privacy, false endorsement, or public ridicule.
The first case to permit recovery on the plaintiff's right to com-
pensation for the use of a facial likeness was decided two years later
in Missouri. 7 This opinion was also the first to recognize the legitimacy
of commercialization of the persona. The opinion deserves to be quoted
at length to show the evolution of judicial reasoning.
One may have peculiarity of appearance, and if it is to be made
a matter of merchandise, why should it not be for his benefit?
It is a right which he may wish to exercise for his own profit,
and why may he not restrain another who is using it for gain?
If there is value in it, sufficient to excite cupidity of another,
why is it not the property of him who gives it the value and
from whom the value springs? 76
The Advertising Market
A brief excursion into the history of advertising demonstrates that
pictorial and representational graphics and celebrity endorsements in-
creased considerably in the period 1890 to 1930. Advertisers repeatedly
pushed back the ethical frontiers of their trade, expanding public tol-
erance for conduct which had been scandalous not long before. In the
process the advertising community created a legitimate market for items
such as name and likeness which had previously been out of commerce.
The rapid evolution of legal doctrine during this period demonstrates
the growing acceptance of judges for the notion that the persona might
be a commodity and the individual's right to exclude others from his
name and likeness was well established by the second decade of this
century. In later years the further expansion of this market encouraged
judges to endow the persona with other characteristics of property:
alienability and heritability.
Most newspapers did not employ pictorial advertising until the close
of the nineteenth century. 77 Some of the first pictorials were billboards
74. Id. at 366.
75. Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. App. 1911).
76. Id. at 1078.
77. E. Turner, The Shocking History of Advertising! 196-97 (1953).
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in Paris featuring the art of Toulouse-Lautrec. When this form of
promotion reached Britain about 1887, critics greeted the phenomenon
with cries of "degradation of art!" According to historians of adver-
tising, artists regarded the possibility that their work might appear on
billboards with distress.
Yet what could they do, apart from choosing subjects which
could conceivably be used to further the sales of soap? If there
was a falling-off in the number of nudes at the Royal Academy
of 1890, the reason must be that artists were apprehensive lest
their visions of Aphrodite be posted up piecemeal on gable ends,
before ribald mobs, with a legend "So Clean." ' 78
Within the next decade the editorial standards of newspapers began
to allow graphic advertising despite protests of "typographical impro-
priety." ' 79 An English critique moaned that "The Times itself is ready
*.. to clothe advertisements in type which three years ago would have
been considered fit only for street billboards." ' 0
Advances in lithographic technology stimulated the use of pictorial
advertising. Frederick Ives obtained at least seventy patents including
those for reproducing three color-half tones.8" The first color insert in
a U.S. magazine-advertising Pears soap-appeared in 1896.82
Then came what was regarded as a flood of illustrations, the human
character trademark being an early and effective use of the new aid.83
Advertising copy began to feature pictures of real people in lieu of
stereotyped artistic conceptions of ideal types. Merchants chose models
to enliven their ads when advances in photo-electric engraving reduced
the costs of such displays.8 4 Entrepreneurs organized professional mod-
eling agencies to take advantges of this trend. Beatrice Tonneson, a
pioneer in the use of live models offered "beautiful and fascinating
women, handsome men and pretty, bewitching children.''85 Contempo-
raries marveled at advertisements for the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
78. Id. at 153-54. In the 1880's advertisers in England began to purchase paintings
by famous artists to illustrate their ads.
79. Id. at 196.
80. Id.
81. F. Presbrey, The History and Development of Advertising 386 (1929).
82. Id. at 358.
83. Id. at 356.
84. R. Hower, The History of an Advertising Agency: N.W. Ayer & Son at Work,
1869-1949, 303 (1949).
85. E. Turner, supra note 77, at 172.
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Railroad in which Tonneson models filled well-appointed dining cars.
Yet despite this explosion in the use of live models, the industry did
not employ professional models to sell underwear until the 1920s. s6
Of course, promoters continued to capture the photos of unwilling
models as well. Newspaper accounts of the complaints of these uncon-
senting subjects generally adhere to the same pattern which the litigation
revealed: in the early years the victims were embarrassed 'by the ads,
later they claimed compensation for services. President Theodore Roos-
evelt objected to the city of Spokane's use of his portrait to promote
the Lewis and Clark Trail in 1905. A representative of the chamber of
commerce expressed the opinion that the city should comply "although
there is no law compelling the recall of the booklet. '8 7 Even more
illustrative is the "mental anguish" which a local beauty queen suffered
when a picture she had submitted to the beauty contest later appeared
in an advertisement for a patent medicine.8 8 She "began to notice ...
that some of her friends ... were looking at her with pitying faces
The licensing on one's name and likeness for advertising purposes
bore some stigma as late as the 1920s. The friends of John Philip Sousa
"made sport" of the great composer when the manufacturer of a three-
cent cigar adopted his likeness as its trademark. 9 "Many of Sousa's
friends ... saw the advertisement and believed the plaintiff had sold
his name and picture for use in connection with the advertisement."
Sousa was particularly incensed that his portrait graced a cheap cigar.
Sousa's reticence was not typical of inadvertant models in the 1920s.
Young ladies who might have "taken to bed" in humiliation at the
turn of the century at the sight of their face on a flour ad were now
avidly negotiating these commercial transactions. One newspaper headline
of the period proclaimed, "Brooklyn Girl Asks $25,000-Wanted Only
$25 Originally. '" 90 The story related that the plaintiff, another beauty
queen, had refused a five dollar fee for her likeness, "though she had
been willing originally to accept $25 for her rights to the picture." At
about the same time a demure eighteen year-old housewife recognized
her own countenance kneading dough on a poster.9' She sought damages
of $50,000 for the use of her likeness without consent. The young lady
pled only her right to compensation-no embarrassment or humiliation.
Society no longer viewed these transactions as quasi-illicit.
86. Id. at 225-26.
87. New York Times, July 26, 1905, at 1, col. 2.
88. New York Times, Aug. 21, 1907, at 7, col. 3.
89. New York Times, May 23, 1924, at 2, col. 4.
90. New York Times, Jan. 25, 1928, at 25, col. 6.
91. New York Times, Dec. 9, 1926, at 25, col. 6.
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Enterprising people in business organized to take advantage of the
opportunities created by these new social mores. A Chicago firm, Famous
Names, Inc. claimed a stable of stage and screen stars willing to promote
any product for a price. 92
With the star's endorsement ... the advertiser may have a
specially posed picture of the celebrity and the exclusive right
to that name against all competitors.
The director of one such firm responded to suspicion that celebrities
were insincerely selling their names, boasting, "No star endorses any
product that he or she does not use. There is no misrepresentation. " 93
An article on "The Testimonial Game" cast doubt on these claims,
reporting that "the advertiser may specify the poses he desires and ...
the endorsement signed by the star can be of your own dictation."
94
By 1930 skepticism about the authenticity of these endorsements
became widespread, fueled by newspaper reports that non-smoking ce-
lebrities were endorsing cigarettes.95 The Federal Trade Commission an-
nounced an investigation of the business of celebrity endorsements with
particular attention on the athletic market. The FTC insisted that the
merchants disclose the payment of compensation for endorsements.9 In
response manufacturers adopted a code of conduct stating that they
would no longer claim that athletes whose names appeared on products
had designed them and they would disclose the existence of any ar-
rangement under which a team, league or player used their product for
pay.'
One of the covenants in this code of conduct recognized that a firm
may acquire "exclusive property rights or good will" in the name of
an athlete. Members agreed not to interfere willfully in a contractual
arrangement between a competitor and any athlete "where the effect of
the interference would be to dissipate the good-will of the competitor
in the use of the name." This covenant gave effect privately to a featur6
of persona which the law did not recognize until the 1950s: the right
to assign exclusive rights to a celebrity's name. During the first half of
this century a contract for the use of a celebrity's name merely bound
the star not to sue. It was not an assignment affecting third parties.
Legal recognition of effective assignment of celebrity persona was the
next important step in the characterization of this form of property.
92. New York Times, Nov. 9, 1926, at 15, col. 7.
93. New York Times, Nov. 10, 1926, at 20, col. 4.
94. Id.
95. E. Turner, supra note 77, at 241.
96. New York Times, Apr. 20, 1930, Sec. 2, at 7, col. 6.
97. New York Times, May 8, 1930, at 15, col. 2.
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After 1930 the unwilling subjects of photographic advertisements
rarely based their claim for damages on embarrassment.98 Cases rec-
ognizing the commodification of persona are too common to discuss
individually. A sample of the language in which judges described this
right will illustrate the point. An Indiana tribunal agreed with the petition
of an optician who alleged that he had "a property right in his personal
likeness and its use by the appellant ... made its future use to him
entirely worthless for advertising purposes . ."99 Another litigant, who
had spent more than $1.5 million dollars to publicize his own likeness
and customarily earned five thousand dollars for endorsements, brought
suit against a carpet company for unauthorized use of his name.1'0 The
court agreed that the plaintiff's persona was "a valuable commercial
commodity." Such use as the defendant had made of his likeness "is
in effect a theft of a valuable property right .... "o101 A third panel
held that the golfer Ben Hogan "has an enforceable property right in
the commercial value of his name and photograph .. ,2
Rounding Out the Right of Persona
In view of this impressive body of authority recognizing that the
persona had become a form of property, astute observers might have
98. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. 1952) is exceptional,
perhaps because of the nature of the product.
99. Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 86 N.E. 2d 306 (Ind. App. 1949).
100. Rosenberg v. Lee's Carpet & Furniture Warehouse Outlet, 363 N.Y.S.2d 231
(Sup. Ct. 1974).
101. Id. at 233.
102. Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., Inc., 114 USPQ 314 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas. 1957).
"The unauthorized use of another's name and picture can no more be countenanced by
the law then can the illegal appropriation for profit of any form of another's property."
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (S. Ct. N.Y. 1964).
Considering whether a celebrity who never endorsed products could recover damages
from a magazine which used his name without permission, a New York court compared
persona to land: "If the owner of a Blackacre decides for reasons of his own not to
use the land but to keep it in reserve he is not precluded from prosecuting trespassers."
Grant v. Esquire, 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Noting that a name may
acquire "very substantial value" a Massachussets court concluded that "rights of a
pecuniary nature have been created which partake of the elements of property rights
.... " Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358, 361 (D. Mass. 1934).
Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp.; 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 926, 76 S. Ct. 783 (1956); O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941),
cert. den., 315 U.S. 823, 62 S. Ct. 917 (1942); Sherman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc.,
216 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55 (N.C. 1938); Canessa v.
J.1. Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d (Super. N.J. 1967); Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names,
Likeness and Personal Histories, 51 Tex. L. Rev. 637, 651 (1973); Prosser and Keeton,
Torts 854 (5th ed. 1984). Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality, and
History, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 553 (1960); Comment, Transfer of the Right of Publicity:
Dracula's Progeny and Privacy's Stepchild, 2 UCLA L. Rev. 1103 (1975).
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forecast that this new legal animal would soon sprout the other modern
characteristics of commodities: alienability and heritability. The only
restraint on this evolutionary process after 1930 was the inappropriate
analogy of persona to trademarks which, of course, are not vendible
in gross. 103 The analogy is unfortunate because trademarks are not
property but devices to identify goods with their manufacturer.'0 4 The
persona performs no such function; it is merely an ornament in the
advertisement.
One student author drew this conclusion as early as 1914. The
litigation which was the basis of the student comment involved two
companies, each of which claimed to hold an assignment of the right
to use the likeness of an actress in posters. 05 The court held that the
right of privacy is unassignable. The shrewd student author perceived
the beginnings of a social development which his elders did not notice
for another forty years: the distinction between privacy and publicity.
Generally, one's interest that his name or picture not be pub-
lished or broadcast is an interest of personality. But if the owner
has treated it as of pecuniary value, or if by virtue of his
profession or business it has become such, privacy ceases to be
the dominant element, for there is now the distinct interest of
substance that no one interfere with that name or picture to
detract from its value.1 6
Values become property by entering the market as commodities. The
actress reified her likeness, transformed it into a thing, by contractually
transferring exclusive rights to use it. According to the hypothesis which
Pashukanis proposed, once values become objects in commerce, the law
should protect the purchaser by shielding the commodity from trespass.
When finally the legal system did come around to this point of view,
judges sometimes distinguished between celebrities who had dealt with
their persona as a commodity and those who had not to determine
whether the right of publicity survived the star's death.
Many subsequent cases which raised the issue of heritability actually
concerned privacy, an interest in seclusion, rather than the commodity
of celebrity persona. Courts properly held that parents had no standing
to raise the right of privacy of their deceased children as a basis for
103. Callman, Unfair Competition, Trademarks, and Monopolies § 78.1, at 418 (3d
ed. 1969).
104. Id. § 65, at 1-2. The existence of a competitive relationship between the plaintiff
and defendant is ordinarily a prerequisite to trademark infringement. Id. § 67, at 51.
105. Pekas Co. v. Leslie, 52 N.Y.L.J. 1864 (N.Y. S. Ct.).
106. Note, Possible Interest in One's Name or Picture, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 690
(1914).
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enjoining publication of their photos in news stories.107 In other instances
the refusal of the legal system to recognize a heritable right of publicity
could be justified on the grounds that the deceased celebrities never
dealt with their personae as objects of commerce.10
The most important of those cases which denied the ancillary char-
acteristics of property to the right of publicity was decided in 1935. o9
The opinion is instructive because the author articulates ethical objections
to the commodification of persona, objections similar to those which
might be offered today to oppose commercialization of surrogate moth-
erhood, fetal tissue or other values which are now out of commerce.
A famous batsman ... might have difficulty in keeping his
name and likeness from respectful use by others. But if they
be his property in a sense, they are not vendible in gross so as
to pass from purchaser to purchaser unconnected with any trade
or business. Fame is not merchandise. It would help neither
sportsmanship nor business to uphold the sale of a famous name
to the highest bidder as property." 0
But the ideology of the market encourages the belief that aspects
of ourselves once considered entirely personal and out of commerce on
grounds which law professors like to call "policy" may become objects
of exchange. Once the legal system has recognized that a value previously
out of commerce has become property, academic commentators often
castigate the old jurisprudence as "hidebound," "impractical." These
commentators fail to recognize the influence of the market in molding
107. Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So. 2d 235 (Ala. 1955); Milner v. Red River Valley
Pub. Co., 249 S.W.2d 227 (Tx. App. 1952). Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1895)
held that the heirs of a distinguished philanthropist had no standing to challenge creation
of a statute in her honor. Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 721 (N.D.
Ill. 1964), aff'd 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 382 U.S. 883, 86 S. Ct. 176 (1965)
dealt with a movie about the late Al Capone. Literary and cinemagraphic biography are
usually outside the right of privacy on first amendment grounds. See also, Donohue v.
Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 272 P.2d 177 (Utah, 1954).
108. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 603 P.2d 454 (Ca. 1979); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Ca. 1979) (a dissent by three members of the court
argued that persona should have all attributes of property.). Schumann v. Loew's Inc.,
135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (S. Ct. 1954). The Lugosi case implies that the right of publicity might
have been heritable had the actor dealt with it as a commodity in life.
109. Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Brodsky Co., 78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir.), cert. den.,
296 U.S. 645, 56 S. Ct. 248 (1935). See adverse comments, Note, Trade-Marks and Trade
Names-Right of Privacy-Action by Assignee of Baseball Player's Name Against Use by
Competing Ball Manufacturer, 36 Col. L. Rev. 502 (1936); Note, Unfair Competition-
Rights Under Contract Giving Exclusive Advertising Use of Famous Name, 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 496 (1936).
110. 78 F.2d at 766.
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their own ideas. They praise the new jurisprudence as "intuitive," "down-
to-earth," unconstrained by "morality,""' without recognizing that the
faculty of "common sense" which renders these holdings valid is nothing
more than the dominant ideology of the day. In the process of shaping
our notions of "common sense" the market also modifies our concept
of morality.
The case which first articulated this "down-to-earth" notion that
the right of persona was assignable came from the Second Circuit in
1953.112 Like the opinion which held that "fame is not merchandise,"
this matter also involved professional athletes. Absent from the opinion
is any discussion of the moral impropriety of commercialization. An
altogether different perception forms the court's opinion-that many
celebrities "would feel sorely deprived if they could no longer receive
money for authorizing advertisements ....
Subsequent courts recognized the "purely commercial nature" of
the right of publicity," 4 and later cases which took up these issues
omitted any consideration of the ethical problems of commodification."5
The logic inherent in characterizing this form of value as "property"
led judges to hold that the right of persona was also heritable. As one
judge candidly remarked, "There appears to be no logical reason to
terminate this right upon death of the person protected. It is for this
reason, presumably, that this publicity right has been deemed a 'property
right."' 6 One federal district judge revealed how far the process of
reification may influence our sense of reality when he proclaimed that
Elvis Presley's persona had "attained a concrete form" because the
entertainer marketed it during life." 7
The culmination of this line of jurisprudence protected the persona
of Rev. Martin Luther King from trespass although the civil rights leader
111. S. Halpern, The Law of Defamation, Privacy, Publicity and "Moral Rights" 515
(1988).
112. Haelen Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. den.,
346 U.S. 816, 74 S. Ct. 26 (1953).
113. Id. at 868.
).14. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
115. Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. den.,
456 U.S. 927, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215
(2d Cir.), cert. den., 440 U.S. 906, 99 S. Ct. 1215 (1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 541 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F.
Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell,
733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. App. 1987); Commerce Union Bank v. Coors, 7 Med. L. Rep.
224 (Tenn. Chan. Ct. 1981).
116. Price, 400 F. Supp. at 843. "A logical extension of the concept that misappro-
priation of one's name or public personality is a compensable trespass to property has
been the recognition of the so-called 'right of publicity."' Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316
F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Minn. 1970) (emphasis added).
117. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 (D.N.J. 1981).
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had never commercialized his name or likeness in life."' The persona
is property, the court said, irrespective of whether its owner treats it
as a commodity. In its reasoning the court turned the ethical obligations
to commercialization of one's persona on their head. Whereas judges
a half century ago had objected to the deleterious effect of merchandizing
on society," 9 this panel ruled that denying the right of publicity to one
who did not commercialize his name during life would place "a premium
on exploitation.' '" The persona of the martyred civil rights leader should
be entitled to the same protection as that of a professional model.' 2'
The Content of Persona
Characterization of a value as property does not solve the question
of content of this right. For example, societies which permit private
ownership of land have reached diverse conclusions on the proprietor's
right to subsurface minerals'2 and riparian claims.2 3 Ownership of the
soil may omit these rights from its content without being for that reason
any less property. Once the legal system has identified a value as
property, the logic inherent in the classification encourages expansion
of the right. In the previous section I showed how this expansion occurred
vertically to endow the persona with heritability and alienability. The
legal system has also expanded the right of publicity horizontally to
include manifestations of one's personality other than name and likeness.
Two considerations drive this expansion. The first is commerciali-
zation of other aspects of persona. The saturation of the airwaves with
celebrity performances increases public awareness of the dramatic style,
mannerisms, intonation or voice of a star. Public recognition of these
additional features of the persona permits advertisers to imitate these
traits, to create the impression that the star is performing and to achieve
the same or greater promotional benefit than they would obtain by
using the celebrity's name or likeness. Moreover, judges recognize that
celebrities almost invariably receive compensation for performing in com-
mercials. Bargaining for performance rights creates a commodity of the
118. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change Inc. v. American Heritage
Products, Inc. 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
119. See cases cited supra note 109.
120. 296 S.E. 2d at 705-06.
121. Id. at 700.
122. La. Civ. Code art. 490 states: "Unless otherwise provided by law, the ownership
of a tract of land carries with it the ownership of everything that is directly above or
under it." La. Civ. Code art. 490(l)(1990). Political Constitution of Mexico (1917) art.
27 provides that the nation owns all mineral deposits. Constitucion Politica Mexicana art.
27 (1969).
123. 5A, R. Powell & P. Rohan, Powell on Real Property, P 7081211a] and [b).
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elements of the performance. One who imitates the celebrity's identifiable
performance style is trespassing upon that commodity.
Why did defendants ask Midler to sing if her voice was not of
value to them? Why did they studiously acquire the services of
a sound-alike and instruct her to imitate Midler if Midler's voice
was not of value to them? What they sought was an attribute
of Midler's identity. Its value was what the market would have
paid Midler to have sung the commercial in person. 24
The second factor which encourages judges to expand the content
of persona is their aversion to creating arbitrary distinctions. Elements
of a celebrity's performance style,2 5 a star's sobriquet' 26 or mannerisms 27
are manifestations of a star's individuality as surely as their name and
likeness. Consistency impels judges to include these attributes within the
protected sphere. The only distinction which the courts have comfortably
drawn to date is a line separating a celebrity's personal traits from his
personal possessions. Although fans of a race-car driver might identify
him by his automobile, the color, contour and decoration of his vehicle
are not a manifestation of his talent. 28
In contrast to those factors which encourage the expansion of the
content of the right of persona, two considerations limit its development.
The first is the familiar situation in which rights of property owners
are limited by important competing claims. In some jurisdictions the
rights of a shopping center to exclude others are circumscribed by rights
of free speech. 29 The rights of a woman to obtain an abortion are
limited after a certain point in the pregnancy by the rights of the unborn
124. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
125. Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962) protecting Bert Lahr's
"creative talent, voice, vocal sounds and vocal comic delivery." But see Booth v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) denying protection to Shirley Booth's
"timing, inflection, tone, or general performing style." See also Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S. Ct. 2849 (1977) involving appropriation
of the celebrity's performance itself.
126. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir.
1983). "[A]ppellee had appropriated Carson's identity" even though it did not use his
name. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wisc. 1979) protecting the
nickname "crazy legs."
127. Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (App. Div.
2d Dept. 1977). "Guy Lombardo has invested 40 years in developing his public personality
as Mr. New Year's Eve, an identity that has some marketable status." Groucho Marx
Productions, Inc. v. Day and Night Company, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
128. Bronson v. Fawcett Publications, 124 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. II1. 1954).
129. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 92 S. Ct. 2219 (1972); Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976).
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child. 30 In the case which we are considering the most important coun-
tervailing consideration is the first amendment. Courts long ago rec-
ognized that a celebrity's right of publicity does not preclude others
from incorporating a person's name, features or biography in a literary
work,' motion picture,'3 2 news or entertainment story. 3  Only use of
the individual's identity in advertising infringes on the persona.
The other factor which may limit the expansion of protected celebrity
traits is the private property rights of others who contribute to the
performance. Usually copyright law protects these rights. Bela Lugosi's
performance of Dracula is part of his persona only to the extent that
a judge can disentangle his contribution to the role from those of Brain
Stoker and the author of the screenplay. 34 In two cases courts have
denied relief to celebrities whose performances were imitated on account
of the contribution of authors to the stars' rendition. 33 A star has
protected rights in a performance only to the extent that they add a
substantial identifiable element to what existed before. The timing, in-
flection, tone and other distinctive characteristics of the performance
must be the fruit of the celebrity's interpretive talents, not the product
of the author's stage directions.
0 body swayed to music, or brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?' 36
Reification of the right of publicity has proceeded just as Pashukanis
might have predicted: an interest protected by tort law became a com-
modity as it entered commerce, guarded first from trespass, then endowed
with alienability and heritability. By hypothesis commodification should
also explain how other forms of value have or will become property.
Inventions and writings have become things in the relatively recent past.
Many public officers were once private property-heritable and alien-
able-until modern times. Trade secrets were well on their way to
becoming property until the Supreme Court ruled that states might not
130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
.131. Kline v. Robert M. McBride & Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 674 (S. Ct. 1939).
132. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
133. Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
134. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Ca. 1979) (concurring opinion).
See also Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of Publicity, 29 Hastings
L. Rev. 751 (1978).
135. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
den., 402 U.S. 906, 91 S. Ct. 1376 (1971); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 362
F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
136. W. Yeats, Among School Children, at. 8, lines 7-8.
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protect them from trespass.'"1 Surrogate motherhood may be in the
process of commodification now. This essay is an invitation to others
who may teach or write on these subjects to dispute or support the
validity of the claims of the commodity exchange theory. 138
137. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 84 S. Ct. 704 (1964).
138. Lombardo v. Doy (cite unavailable).
